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ABSTRACT
Artificial Intelligence deals with the challenge of mod-
eling commonsense reasoning. In the last fifteen years
argument-based systems have came forward to meet
this challenge as knowledge representation and rea-
soning tools able to model incomplete and conflicting
information. We believe that the argumentation field
has sufficiently matured in the last years to deserve
a formal analysis of properties of the main existing
argumentation systems.
In this work we propose a set of general principles
for argumentation enunciated in abstract terms, that
can be analyzed in the context of several argumention
formalisms. We intend that these principles help to
achieve a unified formal view of argumentation prop-
erties.
1 INTRODUCTION
Artificial Intelligence deals with the challenge of
modeling commonsense reasoning. In the last
fifteen years argument-based systems have came
forward to meet this challenge as knowledge rep-
resentation and reasoning tools able to model in-
complete and potentialy inconsitent information.
The advantages of these systems when mod-
elling common sense reasoning have sprung a new
set of argumentation-based applications. In par-
ticular, agent systems, and intelligent agents may
profit from the use argumentation formalisms,
since knowledge representation issues play a ma-
jor role in these systems. Well known problems
in the agent community involve the need of com-
plex abilities for reasoning, planning and acting
in dynamic environments [13]. Specially tailored
argumentation systems have also been proposed
for agents interacting in such environments [1].
Argumentation has also gained wide accep-
tance in the multiagent systems (MAS) area
by providing tools for designing and implement-
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ing different features which characterize inter-
action among rational agents [8]. The key to
this success relies in a straightforward formal-
ization of common-sense reasoning that can be
used in decision-making systems. Furthermore,
the argument-based approach can also explain the
reasons that motivated a particular recommenda-
tion.
Argumentation systems have recently been
used in prototypes of real world applications, such
as clustering algorithms [5], intelligent web search
[2], reasoning in multiagent systems [9, 1], It is
also expected that in a near future argumentation
may be integrated with other applications such
as intelligent interfaces, e-commerce agents, and
automatic information processing, among others.
This seemd to indicate that the argumentation
field has evolved considerable in the last years.
We believe that the field has sufficiently ma-
tured to deserve a formal analysis of properties
for the main existing argumentation systems. In
these analysis we ought to seek for the similarities
and differences among the existing systems, and
determine their consequences.
In what follows we propose a set of general prin-
ciples for argumentation. These principles are
enunciated in abstract terms that can be analyzed
in the context of several argumention formalisms.
We intend that these principles help to achieve a
unified formal view of argumentation properties.
2 GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR
ARGUMENT SYSTEMS
To analyze properties of argumentation systems
we identify two key elements in these formalisms:
a process for obtaining arguments and a classifica-
tion process that determines whether arguments
are warranted. Only warranted arguments can
be used to obtain inferences. This inference pat-
tern is generally used by argumentation systems
despite their differences.
In this section we enunciate a set of abstract
principles we think should hold on argument sys-
tems. These principles are naturally associated
with a set of postulates.
2.1 Argument level
The argument construction level is what Prakken
and Vreeswijk call logical level. In this level argu-
ments are obtained from the knowledge base ac-
cording to some specific process. Generally, the
knowledge base contains some kind of schemes
that can be considered as domain-independent
reasoning patterns. These schemes resemble rules
of inference in deductive logics, but are not re-
stricted to them. They can include non-deductive
logics and are not restricted to classical logical in-
ference. This is the first process that suffers the
information in the knowledge base.
Every argument requires some kind of deriva-
tion or a general notion of consequence that con-
nects its conclusion with a set of premises and
schemes obtained from the the knowledge base.
Some formalisms (such as [11, 4, 7]) also require
a set of restrictions on this derivation so it can be
considered an argument. Others prefer to take an
unrestricted approach (for example, [6, 12]).
In this work we present arguments in favor of
the first view. We show that using unrestricted
arguments leads to a set of undesirable situations
in the inference process. We believe that at least
two restrictions should be supported: consistency
and minimality. Consistency is by far the most
important. Generally, an argument is considered
consistent if it does not support contradictory lit-
erals.
Consistency avoids self-defeating arguments[6].
An argument is self-defeating if it defeats itself ac-
cording to the system’s defeat definition. Pollock
[6] mentions that in his system this type of argu-
ments collapses the inference process, an devices a
set of conditions to avoid them in the defeat graph
construction. This and other problems will arise
in any argumentation system if self-defeating ar-
guments are allowed.
We believe that self defeating arguments should
be avoided in every argument system. Neverthe-
less, even in the case that self defeat is allowed, it
should be evident that no self defeating argument
should be warranted.
Postulate 2.1 (Self defeating) For an argumen-
tation system AS, its inference procedure should
be warrant any self defeating argument. 
If self-defeating arguments are simply avoided
this postulate is trivially satisfied. This happens
when arguments are required to be consistent,
since argumentation systems use the notion of
consistency to define attack or conflict among ar-
guments. An argument A attacks another argu-
ment B if some element in B cannot coexist with
some element in A, given that their mutual acep-
tance produces an inconsistency. Therefore, a no-
tion of internal consistency of arguments avoids
any of such conflicts.
Another usual restriction is minimality of argu-
ments [11, 4, 7]. This notion varies according to
the argument definition. If arguments are defined
as sets minimality is a fundamental requirement.
In such cases minimality avoids unnecessary rules.
Note that unnecessary rules present in an argu-
ment only weaken it, creating more attack points.
An argument B could conflict with another argu-
ment A attacking one of the superfluous rules in
A. Even this seems to be an obvious require-
ment, there are argumentation systems that do
not avoid this kind of attacks, such as [12].
2.2 Inference engine
To support an abstract analysis of inference prop-
erties, we endorse viewing argumentative infer-
ence engines as composed of four fundamental re-
lations among arguments:
• Subargumentation: This relation denotes a
kind of inclusion between arguments. In fact
when arguments are defined as sets it is sim-
ply defined as set inclusion. If arguments
are defined as inference trees, they are de-
fined as sub-trees. It is highly dependant on
argument definition, but the general idea re-
mains the same in every case. Let AS be an
argumentation system, then we denote its as-
sociated sub-argument relation as SAS.
• Attack: This notion has been defined in
many ways in argumentation systems. The
general idea is to characterize conflicting
pairs of arguments. Let AS be an argumen-
tation system, then we denote its associated
attack relation as AAS.
• Concordance: This relation is the dual of at-
tack. Two arguments are concordant if their
simultaneous acceptance does not lead to a
contradiction. This relation, such as sub-
argumentation, can be considered an agree-
ment relation among arguments. Let AS be
an argumentation system, then we denote its
associated concordance relation as CAS.
• Defeat: This relation is a refinement of at-
tack. It defines a way of deciding conflicts
between arguments. It is usually based on an
preference criterion. Let AS be an argumen-
tation system, then we denote its associated
defeat relation as DAS.
These four relations are key elements in argu-
mentation systems. Next we formulate a set of
postulates using these relations and the following
definitions:
Definition 2.1 (Internal attacks) Let AS be an
argumentation system. The relation internal at-
tacks, denoted as IAAS is defined as AAS ∩ SAS .

Intuitively, this relation represent attacks occur-
ring in self defeating arguments. If no self defeat
is allowed, IAAS = ∅.
Definition 2.2 (Concordant family) Let AS be
an argumentation system and A an argument in
the AS system. The family of arguments concor-
dant with A, denoted as concordant(A) is defined
as: concordant(A) = {B|(A,B) ∈ CAS}. 
The first postulate relates subargumentation
and concordance.
Postulate 2.2 (Inclusion) Let AS be an argu-
ment systems. Then SAS − IAAS ⊂ CAS , that is
to say, the subargumentation relation minus the
internal attacks relation should be a subset of the
concordance relation. 
If no self defeating arguments are allowed, the
sub-argumentation relation should a subset of the
concordance relation. This can be seen as a
stronger version of this postulate that holds in
this special class of argument systems.
If self defeating is allowed, the inclusion can
still hold if we first eliminate the subargumenta-
tion pairs that involve self defeating arguments.
This is reflected in postulate 2.2.
Postulate 2.3 (Disjoints sets) Let AS be an ar-
gument systems. Then AAS ∩ CAS = ∅, that is
to say, attack and concordance should not have
common pairs. 
This is also an intuitive principle: an argument
A is either attacking B or is concordant with B,
but should not do both at the same time.
There are other basic postulates, for example,
sub-argumentation should be an order relation
among arguments. Concordance should be sym-
metric and reflexive (only when self-defeating is
not allowed) but not transitive.
Concordance can also be used to control the
way arguments reinstate, avoiding fallacious sit-
uations, as stated in the following postulate:
Postulate 2.4 (Restricted reinstatement) Given
an argument A, only arguments in its concordant
family, concordant(A), should be used to reinstate
A. 
Reinstatement is a common concept in most
modern argument systems. It defines a kind of
support. It is reasonable that only arguments
concordant with A can support or defend A from
other attacks. Otherwise, an argument B could
be supporting and attacking an argument A.
The next postulate concerns the defeat rela-
tion. In general, this relation relies on the on the
preference criteria used by the system. Different
criteria have been proposed in the literature, and
some authors have even chosen to parametrize the
systems with respect to the preference criterion to
make it more flexible [4, 7].
In this setting, different criteria can be used ac-
cording to the particular domain under consider-
ation. Even tough this is an interesting approach,
we consider that some general restrictions should
be used to prevent inadequate criteria from being
used. In this sense, Vreeswijk [12] and Simari
et al. [10] have proposed different sets of re-
strictions. In what follows we analyze both ap-
proaches to obtain a general postulate regarding
preference criteria.
Simari et al. propose that the preference cri-
terion should establish a partial order in the set
of arguments. Vreeswijk enunciated a set of re-
strictions to ensure the coherence of the defeat
relation. To do this, a given preference criterion
< should:
1. be reflexive and transitive,
2. do not form infinite chains: A1 < A2 < . . . <
An < . . .,
3. for every pair of arguments A and B such
that A is a sub-argument of B it holds that
B ≤ A.
In this case the relation ≤ may not be a partial
order, considering that antisymmetry does not
necessarily hold. If we compare both approaches,
we can see that reflexivity and transitivity are
common elements.
Infinite chains are not explicitly forbidden in
Simari’s approach, but combining transitivity
and antisymmetry this arises as a collateral re-
sult in systems with a finite set of arguments:
Proposition 2.1 Let ≤ be a reflexive, antisym-
metric and transitive preference criterion over a
finite set of arguments. Then there are no infinite
chains of the form: A1 < A2 < . . . < An < . . .. 
Proof Suppose there is an infinite chain σ.
Since the set of arguments is finite, there is an
argument A1 such that σ = A1 < A2 < . . . <
An < A1 < . . .. Then σ is circular. By tran-
sitivity, we can affirm that A1 < An. And by
antisymmetry, since An < A1, A1 6< An. This
contradiction arose from the initial supposition.

But conditions (1) and (2) of Vreeswijk’s def-
inition do not imply that < is a partial order.
Therefore, requiring that the preference criterion
be a partial order is more restrictive than the first
and second condition of Vreeswijk’s work. Nev-
ertheless, antisymmetry seems an intuitive and
adequate condition.
Regarding the third condition it is reasonable
than an argument cannot be made stronger by
adding more rules, but we believe that this con-
dition should emerge as a property of the ar-
gumentation system, rather than be required by
an explicit condition of the preference criterion.
To sum up, we conclude the following postulate
about preference criterion:
Postulate 2.5 (Preference criteria) Preference
criteria for argumentation systems should induce
a partial order on the set of arguments. 
It is interesting to consider the interaction
among the defined relations and the set of war-
ranted arguments that are sanctioned by a given
knowledge base. The first postulate in this re-
spect is associated with the concept of conflict-
free sets [3]:
Postulate 2.6 (Conflict-free warrant) The set
of warranted arguments of a given knowledge base
must be a conflict-free set, that is, there is no pair
of arguments A, B such that A is a counterargu-
ment of B. 
A natural corollary of this postulate is the consis-
tency of the set of conclusions sanctioned by the
system.
Another important postulate relates sub-
argumentation and the set of warranted argu-
ments, and was first enunciated by Vreeswijk [12]
as a desirable property of argumentation systems.
Postulate 2.7 (Warranted sub-arguments) Let
A be a warranted argument. Then for every ar-
gument B such that B is a sub-argument of A it
should hold that B is a warranted argument. 
In other words, when accepting an argument A,
we are implicitly accepting all of its subargu-
ments.
3 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
WORK
We have proposed a set of principles for the de-
sign of argument systems general enough to be
applied to different formalisms. By the analysis
of these principles we have identified a set of key
aspects in argumentation systems. Principle 2.1
emerges among them as a fundamental issue, be-
ing a base for many coherent properties in argu-
ment systems.
Moreover, we believe that self-defeating argu-
ments should better be eliminated from the in-
ference mechanism. On the one hand this simpli-
fies the system, and on the other hand it is also
a philosophical matter, self defeating arguments
do not have the strength to support their conclu-
sions.
As future work, we believe that it should be
interesting to test the proposed principles in the
main existing argumentation formalisms.
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